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B OTH Section 1331 of the Judicial Code, dealing with fed-
eral question jurisdiction, and Section 1332, which deals
with diversity jurisdiction, contain the further jurisdictional
requirement that the matter in controversy exceed the sum
or value of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs.'
Originally, this amount had been over 500, exclusive of
costs; 2 then over $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs; '
* This is the first of two articles by Professor Ilsen and Mr. Sardell on
this subject. The second article will appear in the May issue of the ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW.
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
: Member of the New York and Federal Bars.
I For a criticism of the amount requirement in federal question jurisdiction,
see Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAW & CONTEUP. PROB. 216, 225 (1948). It is important to remember that
"The Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, for the first time, invested the Circuit
Courts of the United States, without reference to the citizenship of the parties,
with original jurisdiction of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in
equity, where the matter in dispute exceeded a prescribed sum, and the suit
was one 'arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.'"
Continental Nat. Bank v. Buford, 191 U.S. 119, 122 (1903).
2 1 STAT. 78 (1789) (for diversity cases) ; 18 STAT. 470 (1875) (for fed-
eral question cases).
324 STAT. 552 (1887) (applying both to diversity and federal question
cases).
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and finally over $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 4  In
the Eighty-Second Congress a bill was introduced to increase
the jurisdictional threshold to over $10,000, exclusive of in-
terest and costs.5
From the beginning suits between citizens of different states, or in-
volving federal questions, could neither be brought in the federal
courts nor removed to them, unless the value of the matter in con-
troversy was more than a specified amount. Cases involving lesser
amounts have been left to be dealt with exclusively by state courts,
except that judgment of the highest court of a state adjudicating a
federal right may be reviewed by this Court. . . The policy of the
statute calls for its strict construction.6
Under statutory interpleader, the money, property or ob-
ligation which is the subject matter of the action must be of
the "amount or value" of at least $500 before jurisdiction will
attach.7  The basis of federal jurisdiction in this type of ac-
tion is diversity of citizenship of the adverse claimants, not
diversity of citizenship between the stakeholder or debtor on
the one side, and the claimants on the other.8
There are, however, important cases arising under fed-
eral law to which the jurisdictional amount requirement of
Section 1331 does not apply. Most of these cases are specifi-
cally enumerated in Title 28.9
It has been said that the "matter in controversy" is the
end sought by the plaintiff and brought in issue by the de-
462 STAT. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952).
5 H.R. 3098, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). This bill applies to and amends
Section 1332 as well as Section 1331 of Title 28. It passed the House of Rep-
resentatives on May 19, 1952, but was not acted upon by the Senate. The
original recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States was
to increase the amount to $7,500. See Report of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, H.R. Doc. No. 365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1952).
a Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 269-270 (1934).
7 62 STAT. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1952); 62 STAT. 970 (1948), 28
U.S.C. §2361 (1952).
862 STAT. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (1952).
9 See, e.g., 62 STAT. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1952) (bankruptcy);
62 STAT. 932 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1339 (1952) (postal matters) ; 62 STAT. 932(1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1952) (civil rights) ; 62 STAT. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1345 (1952) (United States as plaintiff); 62 STAT. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (1952) (United States as defendant). It should not be overlooked that
there are also many special jurisdictional provisions enacted and incorporated
in other titles of the United States Code; see long list set out in Historical
and Revision Notes to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (1949).
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fendant 10 and that the term "matter in controversy" may be
used interchangeably with "matter involved" and "matter in
dispute." 11
Relevant here is the "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule, so char-
acterized by Professor (now Circuit Judge) Dobie in an arti-
cle written by him in 1925.12 The rule may be stated as
follows: the measure of the amount in controversy is "... the
value to the plaintiff of the right which he in good faith
asserts in his pleading that sets forth the operative facts
which constitute his cause of action.' 13 Although this view
has been criticized, 14 it does seem to conform with the lan-
guage of the cases, and has been generally followed.1 5
In limine, the matter in controversy must be one "capable
of pecuniary estimation." 16 It has been held that where
a state statute permitted a creditor to bring action on
a claim before it was due and attach the property of the al-
leged creditor, a United States court of first instance had
20 "It is not necessary that the defendant should controvert or dispute the
claim. It is sufficient that he does not satisfy it!' It re Metropolitan Ry.
Receivership, 208 U.S. 90, 108 (1908); see Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 20
(1875).
1 Reynolds v. Burns, 141 U.S. 117 (1891) (bill to enjoin enforcement ofjudgment in ejectment); Decker v. Williams, 73 Fed. 308 (D. Alaska 1896)
(amount involved in an appeal from United States Commissioners).
2 See Dobie, Jurisdictional Amonmt in the United States District Court,
38 HARv. L. RE~v. 733 (1925).
13 Id. at 734.
14 See Note, 4 VA.% L. REv. 146 (1950) citing, inter alia, Shipe v. Floral
Hills, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 985 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (held that test was pecuniary
result to either party which the decree would produce, either at once or in the
future) and Sterl v. Sears, 88 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Tex. 1950). See also
Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R.IL, 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940).
15 St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (193);
Glenwood Light Co. v. Mutual Light Co., 239 U.S. 121 (1915). "It is well
settled that the measure of jurisdiction in a suit for injunction is the value to
plaintiff of the right which he seeks to protect." Purcell v. Summers, 126 F.2d
390, 394 (4th Cir. 1942). "This, the so-called plaintiff's viewpoint test . . .
seems now well settled .... " Central Mexico Light & Power Co. v. Munch,
116 F.2d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 1940). "If it is impossible to assign a pecuniary
value to the thing in controversy, jurisdiction does not exist." McGuire v.
Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414, 418 (D. Md. 1951). See Yankwich, Some Juris-
dictional Pitfalls in Diversity Cases, 2 F.R.D. 388 (1942) ; Notes, 19 MINN.
L. REv. 768 (1935), 17 N.C. L. REv. 427 (1939), 18 TULANE L. REv. 655
(1944) ; Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 274 (1939).
10 Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 20 (1875); see McGuire v. Amrein, supra
note 15.
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jurisdiction (under the federal statute then in force 17) over
a suit brought by an Ohio corporation against a citizen of
Nebraska for $530 past due and 1,664 to become due."8 But
proceedings were held not removable from a state court to a
federal court in the following instances: proceedings to
compel arbitration, 9 mandamus,20 inquisition of lunacy,21
divorce,22 and habeas corpus. 23
Obviously, it would be absurd if the preliminary ques-
tion of determining jurisdiction were made to hinge on the
final judgment resulting.24 Prima facie, therefore, the
amount demanded in the complaint fixes jurisdiction,2 un-
1724 STAT. 552 (1887) (conferring jurisdiction on the Circuit Courts, the
predecessors of the District Courts, over controversies "between citizens of
different States, in which the matter in dispute exceeds" the sum or value of
$2,000).
18 Schunk v. Moline, Milburn & Stoddart Co., 147 U.S. 500 (1893).
19 "The value of an arbitration is one of convenience. No pecuniary value
can be given to it, and a breach can only result in nominal damages." In re
Red Cross Line, 277 Fed. 853, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). See Marchant v. Mead-
Morrison Mfg. Co., 7 F.2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).2 0 Greenough v. Independence Lead Mines Co., 45 F.2d 659 (D. Idaho 1930)
(right to inspect books must be ascertainable in money).
21 United States ex rel. Curtiss v. Haviland, 297 Fed. 431 (2d Cir. 1924).
22 Bowman v. Bowman, 30 Fed. 849 (N.D. Ill. 1887) (not measure of ali-
mony but right to divorce was issue-held not removable). But cf. Block v.
Block, 196 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1952) (suit challenging divorce decree on ground
property settlement therein was obtained by fraud). See Barber v. Barber,
21 How. 582 (U.S. 1858).
23 ,.. [Tihe conclusion is inevitable that a jurisdiction, conferred by
Congress upon any court of the United States, of suits at law or in equity in
which the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of a certain number of
dollars, includes no case in which the right of neither party is capable of being
valued in money. . . ." Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 498 (1885) ; Barry v.
Mercein, 5 How. 103 (U.S. 1847) (habeas corpus by parent to determine cus-
tody of child). See also Horn v. Mitchell, 243 U.S. 247 (1917), Whitney v.
Dick, 202 U.S. 132 (1906) and Cross v. Burke, 146 U.S. 82 (1892), involving
former statute dealing with appeals to the Supreme Court.
24 See Stein v. Tip Top Baking Co., 267 U.S. 226 (1925); Smithers v.
Smith, 204 U.S. 632 (1907) (action to try title to land; denial that its value
was over $2,000; held that plaintiff's good faith allegation was sufficient);
Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897) (action for damages for malicious inter-
ference with constitutional rights) ; Mercer v. Byrons, 200 F.2d 284 (1st Cir.
1952); Southern Rail & Equipment Co. v. Midwest Mfg. & Plating Co., 178
F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1949); Jones v. Drewry's, Ltd., 149 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.
1945) (death claim) ; Home Ins. Co. v. Trotter, 130 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1942) ;
Simecek v. United States Nat. Bank, 91 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1937); Kimel v.
Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 71 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1934) ; Operators' Piano
Co. v. First Wisconsin Trust Co., 283 Fed. 904 (7th Cir. 1922) (though dam-
age found to be below jurisdictional minimum, claim for larger amount was
found actually to have been made in good faith; therefore jurisdiction existed).
25 Stinson v. Dousman, 20 How. 461 (U.S. 1858) ; Bennett v. Butterworth,
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less made fraudulently for the purpose of conferring juris-
diction,26 or unless it is made clear on the face of the record
that the requisite sum is not present.2 7  In such a case, the
fact that a higher amount is demanded will not confer juris-
diction,28 although "[i] t must appear to a legal certainty that
the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to
justify dismissal." 29 In a recent case 30 it appeared that
8 How. 124 (U.S. 1850) (suit for value of four slaves, alleged to be worth
$2,700; jury verdict was $1,200; held that suit was within appellate jurisdic-
tion where threshold amount was $2,000). But cf. Pittsburgh Locomotive &
Car Works v. Nat. Bank of Keokuk, 154 U.S. 626 (1877). See also Lilienthal
v. McCormick, 117 Fed. 89 (9th Cir. 1902) and Kratina v. South Atlantic
S.S. Co., 63 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Ga. 1941).
26 St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938),
51 HARv. L. REv. 1108; Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U.S. 209 (1881) (suit on
bonds, of which plaintiff owned only $994 worth-others transferred to him
to make up jurisdictional amount); Miller-Crenshaw Co. v. Colorado Mill &
Elevator Co., 84 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1936) ("reasonable expectation" test
applied); Operators' Piano Co. v. First Wisconsin Trust Co., supra note 24
(fact that damages found to be below minimum does not show that claim was
colorable); Molina v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 6 F.R.D. 385 (D. Neb. 1947)
(suit for accounting for $50,000 dismissed on showing that one of plaintiffs
had no interest in fund; other had interest amounting to $7.40).
27First Nat. Bank v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 264 U.S. 308 (1924)
(action to enjoin highway commission from constructing on a route different
than that prescribed by law, the prescribed route being one which would en-
hance the value of petitioner's land; dismissed, since no showing that requisite
amount was involved); Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77
(1923) (where entire claim was for $2,100, bill dismissed, in spite of general
allegation in complaint that it exceeded $3,000); North Pacific S.S. Co. v.
Soley, 257 U.S. 216 (1921) (suit to enjoin award for compensation where,
before bill filed, claimant had been cured, and his total disability was less than$3,000; held, no jurisdiction).
28 Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 468 (1898); Colorado Life
Co. v. Steele, 95 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1938) (suit for disability benefits under
life insurance policy). But cf. Calhoun v. Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co.,
166 F.2d 530 (6th Cir. 1948) (Action was governed by Kentucky law, against
gas company which operated pumping plant furnishing motor power to long dis-
tance pipe line; each family group sought $700 for injury to property caused
by violent quaking of the earth during operation of pumps, and $3,500 for dis-
comfort and annoyance; held within court's jurisdiction, although there was
some question as to whether plaintiffs could recover for the consequential dam-
ages under Kentucky law. A "decision upon the merits" is required. The
court, citing the St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. case, supra note 26, stated
that the stricter test of the Vance case will no longer be applied.).
29 "The inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court
jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction. Nor does the
fact that the complaint discloses the existence of a valid defense to the claim."
St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., supra note 26 at 289; Put-In-
Bay Waterworks & Co. v. Ryan, 181 U.S. 409 (1901) (jurisdiction having
attached under allegations of original bill, ex parte affidavit disputing the
amount in controversy was not sufficient to oust it) ; Wetmore v. Rymer, 169
U.S. 115 (1898) (action in ejectment held within federal jurisdiction even
though an affidavit averred that land in question was worth less than juris-
dictional amount). See also Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
so Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Rogers, 81 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. W. Va. 1949),
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plaintiffs licensed motion picture films to defendant-
exhibitors under a percentage agreement and brought suit
in a federal district court to recover sums allegedly withheld
through systematic and continuous under-reporting of ticket
sales. Defendants put the jurisdictional amount in issue,
whereupon plaintiffs, unable to allege or show the exact
amounts withheld, submitted affidavits substantiating a rea-
sonable belief that more than 3,000 was involved. The court
held:
The determination of this question is not dependent upon plain-
tiffs' producing before the Court at this time testimony of the ultimate
facts which they hope to prove in the trial of the cases. It is enough
if they show as facts that they have what they believe, in good faith,
to be reliable information that circumstances which go to make up a
matter in controversy exist, of a magnitude sufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of a Federal Court. 31
AGGREGATING AMOUNTS
In computing the amount in controversy, the courts have
refused to add together the interests of different plaintiffs
suing individually, though their interests may be in a com-
mon fund; 82 the theory being, as expressed in one case, that
2 VAND. L. REv. 705. See also Loew's, Inc. v. Martin, 10 F.R.D. 143 (N.D.
Ohio 1949).
31 Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Rogers, supra note 30 at 583.
32 Rogers v. Hennepin County, 239 U.S. 621 (1916) (three plaintiffs claim-
ing to represent themselves and others- like them similarly situated-550 mem-
bers of a Chamber of Commerce-sued to restrain a county assessment against
them amounting to $40 per individual, assessed by virtue of membership; held,
no jurisdiction even though total sum involved exceeded requisite amount);
Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379 (1901) (individual owners of lots which
were assessed for an improvement sued to restrain the assessment; no single
assessment amounted to $2,000; dismissal affirmed, the Court saying, at page
382: "The 'matter in dispute' within the meaning of the statute is not the
principle involved, but the pecuniary consequences to the individual party, de-
pendent on the litigation, as, for instance, in this suit the amount of the assess-
ment levied, or which may be levied, as against each of the complainants
separately.") ; Clay v. Field, 138 U.S. 464 (1891) (appeal dismissed as to one
of parties, whose interest in fund was below the then appellate jurisdictional
minimum) ; Seaver v. Bigelows, 5 Wall. 208 (U.S. 1867) (Several creditors
joined as plaintiffs to set aside conveyance of property as fraudulent. Action
[ VOL. 29
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where several persons are joined as plaintiffs, but
* . where their interests are distinct, and they are joined for the
sake of convenience only, and because they form a class of parties
whose rights or liabilities arose out of the same transaction, or have
relation to a common fund or mass of property sought to be admin-
istered, such distinct demands or liabilities cannot be aggregated to-
gether for the purpose of giving this court jurisdiction by appeal,
but each must stand or fall by itself alone.33
This case involved the former monetary limitation on the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but the same
principle seems to apply to aggregation in its original juris-
dictional phase. Further, ".... the rule applicable to several
plaintiffs having separate claims, that each must represent
an amount sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, is equally
applicable to several liabilities of different defendants to the
same plaintiff." 11
This principle has also been applied to deny aggregation
of plaintiffs' claims even when it may be argued that they
were derived from the same instrument,35 or where several
plaintiffs have a community of interest.3 6 In an illustrative
was dismissed since interest of each creditor did not exceed jurisdictional
amount, although total fund in litigation did.).
33Clay v. Field, supra note 32 at 479-480.
34 Walter v. Northeastern R.R., 147 U.S. 370, 374 (1893) (action by rail-
road company to enjoin collection of taxes assessed in different counties, which
individually did not amount to $2,000, though the aggregate amount exceeded
that sum) ; Citizens' Bank v. Cannon, 164 U.S. 319 (1896) ; Fishback v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 161 U.S. 96 (1896) (action by Western Union to enjoin
collection of separate county taxes by separate county officers where no one
tax exceeded jurisdictional amount); Northern Pacific R.L v. Walker, 148
U.S. 391 (1893) (The Court, however, declined to dismiss complaint since by
amendment it might be retained as to some one of the defendants. Cause there-
fore remanded with such directions.) ; Matlaw Corp. 'v. War Damage Corp., 164
F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 863 (1948) ; Fechheimer Bros.
Co. v. Barnwasser, 146 F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1945).
35 Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916); cf. Diepen v. Fernow, 1 F.R.D.
378 (W.D. Mich. 1940), 27 VA. L. Rav. 704 (1941) (Three plaintiffs
sued for personal injuries occasioned by same automobile accident; A's claim
was over $3,000, B's and C's claims were each under $3,000. Court dismissed
B's and C's claims, retained A's claim.).
36 Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942) (Conductors and brakemen sued
railroad for deprivation of seniority rights under agreement between railroad
and brotherhood; dismissed on ground that no individual trainman could show
damage of $3,000. Court said, at page 447, that "[i]n a diversity litigation the
value of the 'matter in controversy' is measured not by the monetary result of
determining the principle involved, but by its pecuniary consequence to those
1954]
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case, Charles T. Pinel, a resident of Michigan, died in 1888,
possessed in fee simple of a tract of land and leaving a last
will and testament which was admitted to probate, by which
he left his entire estate to the defendants. He failed to pro-
vide for the plaintiffs, Herman Pinel and Sarah Slyfield, who
were two of his children, and for another child, Charles W.
Pinel. Plaintiffs averred in their complaint that their omis-
sion from the will was not intentional on the part of the
testator, but was made by mistake or accident; that the laws
of Michigan provide that when a testator shall omit to pro-
vide in his will for any of his children, and it shall appear
that such omission was not intentional and was made by
mistake or accident, such child shall have the same share in
the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate; that tes-
tator left a widow and nine children, one of whom was since
deceased; that after testator's death Charles W. Pinel con-
veyed all his interest in the estate to plaintiff Sarah Slyfield;
and that by reason of the premises ". .. 'complainant Her-
man Pinel is entitled to an undivided one-eighth interest, and
complainant Sarah Slyfield to an undivided two-eighths in-
terest, or in all both complainants together to an undivided
three-eighths interest in the aforesaid property, which said
interests are of the value of $4,500 and upwards over and
above all encumbrances.' 37 The prayer was in effect, that
the title of plaintiffs to an undivided three-eighths interest
in the land may be established. In denying jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court held:
The settled rule is that when two or more plaintiffs having sep-
arate and distinct demands unite in a single suit, it is essential that
the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount; but
when several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which
they have a common and undivided interest, it is enough if their in-
terests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount. . . . This case
comes within the former class, since the title of each complainant is
separate and distinct from that of the other; it being evident that the
involved in the litigation.") ; Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939)
(plaintiff-dealers, engaged in importing autos for sale in California, sought to
contest state tax of $15 on each auto; dismissed, except as to dealer who could
show such volume that his individual tax would exceed jurisdictional amount).
3 Pinel v. Pinel, mtpra note 35 at 596.
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testator's omission to provide for one of his children by will, based
upon mistake or accident, is independent of the question whether a like
mistake was made with respect to another child.38
The averment that the interests of the complainants "'... are
of the value of 4,500 and upwards...' is not the legal equiv-
alent of saying that the interest of either complainant is of
the value of more than $3,000." 39
On a sale of land situated in Kentucky, the vendor law-
fully reserved a vendor's lien for the unpaid portion of the
purchase price, for which he took two promissory notes of
$1,200 each, payable in one and two years. Singly, the notes
did not fulfill the jurisdictional amount, but collectively,
they did. Shortly thereafter, the notes were assigned to the
plaintiffs, one to each; and by the law of Kentucky the ven-
dor's lien passed to the assignees, as a common security for
the payment of both notes, without any priority of right in
either assignee. When the notes were unpaid at maturity,
the two assignees brought suit in a federal court in Kentucky
to enforce the vendor's lien, the plaintiffs and their assignor
being citizens of Indiana and the defendant, who had ac-
quired the land with notice of the lien, being a citizen of
Kentucky. The defendant challenged the jurisdiction on the
ground that the matter in dispute was not of the requisite
jurisdictional value. The Supreme Court, in upholding jur-
isdiction, held that the action was of the latter class, namely,
"... when several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title
or right, in which they have a common and undivided
interest .... " The Court stated further:
... [the action's] controlling object-that which makes it cognizable
in equity-is the enforcement of the vendor's lien, which is a single
thing or entity in which the plaintiffs have a common and undivided
interest, and which neither can enforce in the absence of the other.
Thus, while their claims under the notes were separate and distinct,
their claim under the vendor's lien was single and undivided, and the
lien was sought to be enforced as a common security for the payment
of both notes. 40
38 Id. at 596.
39 Id. at 597.
40 Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 41 (1911).
1954]
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A plaintiff has also been permitted, at times, to aggre-
gate against multiple defendants. Thus where the heirs of
one Evans, an intestate, brought suit in a federal court of
first instance against several defendants to enjoin the en-
forcement of claims that had been allowed as liens on Evans'
real estate by orders of a probate court, each claim being less
than the requisite jurisdictional amount, but their aggregate
exceeding that sum, the complaint alleged that these claims
were not debts of the intestate, but that the defendants had
conspired and confederated with the administrator to secure
their payment out of the estate, and that the orders allowing
them had been procured as the result of the conspiracy and
the fraud practiced in pursuance thereof. The Supreme
Court reversed a decree dismissing the complaint on de-
murrer, for want of jurisdiction, and held that, on the face
of the complaint, the value of the matter in dispute was
"1... the aggregate amount of the claims fraudulently pro-
cured by the defendants acting in combination to be allowed
in the Probate Court as claims against the estate. 21 41
CLASS ACTIONS
In those actions which the courts have recognized as true
class actions, 42 the amount in controversy is the total fund
4' McDaniel v. Traylor, 196 U.S. 415, 431 (1905). See also Woodmen of
the World v. O'Neill, 266 U.S. 292 (1924). "A conspiracy to prosecute, by
concert of action, numerous baseless claims against the same person for the
wrongful purpose of harassing and ruining him, partakes of the nature of a
fraudulent conspiracy; and in a suit to enjoin them from being separately
prosecuted, it must likewise be deemed to tie together such several claims as
one claim for jurisdictional purposes, making their aggregate amount the value
of the matter in controversy." Id. at 297-298.
42FEa. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). A true class action is described in the
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 86, comment b (1942) as ". .. an illustration of a
situation where it is not feasible for all persons whose interests may be affected
by an action to be made parties to it. It was invented by equity for situations
in which the number of persons having substantially identical interests in the
subject matter or litigation is so great that it is impracticable to join all of
them as parties, in accordance with the usual rules of procedure, and in which
an issue is raised which is common to all such persons." See Supreme Tribe of
Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) illustrating a true class action. Con-
sider Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 132 A.L.R. 741 (1940); see Keeffe, Levy
and Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327 (1948); Note,




sought to be recovered; this is so even though only plain-
tiffs whose interests are below the jurisdictional minimum
bring the suit.43  In other words, the claims of all the mem-
bers of the class are considered for the purpose of obtaining
the requisite jurisdictional amount.
It may be observed that the term "aggregation" or
"aggregated" as used in some of the cases 4 is somewhat con-
fusing since in fact when the claim is joint, common or sec-
ondary, i.e., a true class action, the courts only consider, in
determining whether the jurisdictional amount is present,
the value of the claim of the entire class, i.e.x, the value of the
single right which all the members of the class hold together.
In contradistinction to the true class action brought to
enforce a joint, common or secondary right just discussed,
Rule 23(a) (2) and (3) also provides for: (1) the class ac-
tion in which the class members have several rights in the
same common res involved in the action, generally referred
to as the "hybrid" type,4 5 and (2) the class action in which
43 Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U.S. 95 (1939), 52 HAv. L. REv. 1360 (lower
court held in error in refusing petitioners [ASCAP] the right to produce evi-
dence as to the cost of complying with a Washington statute regulating license
agreements) ; Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939) (suit to enjoin enforcement
of Florida statute interdicting ASCAP as monopolistic; held, right of all mem-
bers of ASCAP, not just profit of each, was the test) ; McDaniel v. Traylor,
supra note 41; Miller v. National City Bank, 147 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1945);
American Surety Co. v. Bank of California, 133 F2d 160 (9th Cir. 1943).
44 See, e.g., Sturgeon v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 143 F.2d 819 (6th Cir.
1944) ; Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941).
45 For example, the creditors' action for liquidation or reorganization of a
corporation is largely superseded by the adoption of reorganization provisions
in the Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1952).
In Pennsylvania Co. v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941), the court ob-
served at page 983: "If the rights of the individual plaintiffs are separate
causes of action and they have no right to a common fund or to common
property, the class action at bar is a 'spurious' one. If, upon the other hand, the
individual plaintiffs having individual causes of action have also a right to a
common fund or in common property, the class action may be 'hybrid.' It
should be borne in mind that the so-called spurious class cause may be turned
by circumstances into the hybrid action. For example, if a corporation engaged
in the sale of stock by fraudulent means to a number of individuals, under
Rule 23(a) (2) they might join together as parties-plaintiff in one action to
avoid multiplicity of suits though seeking separate judgments. This is the
typical 'spurious' class action. If, on the other hand, the corporation which
they were suing bad become insolvent in the meantime and the plaintiffs were
compelled to look to a common fund in the hands of a receiver for the pay-
ment of their claims, they would then become claimants in a receivership, the
common hybrid action referred to by the learned district judge." See Dickin-
son v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952).
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the persons are interested in a common question of law or
fact and the action is permitted merely to avoid a multiplicity
of suits, generally referred to as the "spurious" type.46
On the matter of the jurisdictional monetary require-
ment, the fundamental difference between the true class ac-
tions on the one hand, and the hybrid and spurious class
actions on the other, is that although the latter are author-
ized by Rule 23, they are "1... but a congeries of separate
suits so that each claimant must, as to his own claim, meet
the jurisdictional requirements," 47 i.e., in our present con-
text, each plaintiff must, as to his own claim show the requi-
site amount in controversy.4 8
ACTIONS BY SHAREHOLDERS
The question presents itself in a stockholder's derivative
action as to what determines the amount in controversy-
the value of the plaintiff's stockholdings in the corporation
or some other basis. The Supreme Court has held that, since
plaintiffs in such cases often have only a small financial
interest in a large controversy and their own financial stake
is often insufficient to make up the jurisdictional amount,
. . . [the] plaintiffs' possible recovery is not the measure of the
amount involved for jurisdictional purposes but that the test is the
damage asserted to have been sustained by the defendant corporation.
Hence, although a plaintiff's own interest may be small, if the condi-
tions laid down by Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for sec-
ondary actions by shareholders are complied with and jurisdiction is
established, the federal courts are empowered to entertain the case.4 9
46 Pennsylvania Co. v. Deckert, szpra note 45. See Kainz v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952).
4 Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164 F.2d 387, 388 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 843 (1948) (suit by noteholders, none of whom owned notes
over $3,000, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
48 Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306
U.S. 583 (1939); Clay v. Field, 138 U.S. 464 (1891); Ames v. Mengel Co.,
190 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Miller v. Woods, 185 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ;
Schuman v. Little Bay Const. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). For
arguments in favor of permitting aggregation in hybrid and spurious class
actions, see Blume, Jurisdictionl Amount in Representative Suits, 15 MINN. L.
REv. 501 (1931); Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 684 (1941).




The reference to Rule 23 is not to Rule 23 (a) discussed above
under class actions 10 but to Rule 23 (b).151 It should not be
overlooked that
[c]lass actions are to be distinguished from the case where an action
is brought by minority shareholders for the benefit of the corporation.
Thus a shareholder may maintain an action in which he seeks to re-
cover from one or more of the directors damages for harm which has
been done to the corporation by the incompetency of the directors.
Likewise a shareholder may bring an action against directors to re-
quire them to bring proceedings in the name of the corporation against
third persons. In neither of these cases is there a class action, since
the shareholder is acting in fact for the corporation itself and does
not represent the other shareholders .... 52
Hence, the jurisdiction is determined by the value of the ob-
ject sought to be gained for the corporation . 3  Where the
, See page 11 sapra.5i""Rule 23. Class Actions
"() Secondary Action by Shareholders. In an action brought to enforce
a secondary right on the part of one or more shareholders in an association,
incorporated or unincorporated, because the association refuses to enforce rights
which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified by oath
and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the trans-
action of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer on a
court of the United States jurisdiction of any action of which it would not
otherwise have jurisdiction. The complaint shall also set forth with particu-
larity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or
trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he desires, and
the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reasons for not making
such effort" FED R. Cirv. P. 23(b).5 2 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 86, comment e (1942). "The cause of action
which such a plaintiff brings before the court is not his own but the corpora-
tion's. It is the real party in interest and he is allowed to act in protection of
its interest somewhat as a 'next friend' might do for an individual, because it
is disabled from protecting itself." Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut.
Cas. Co., supra note 49 at 522-523.
53 "It is the duty of the corporate management to protect the interests of all
stockholders. When, therefore, the corporate management fails in its duty
after the stockholder has met the requirements of Equity Rule 27 [the pre-
decessor of Rule 23(b)], the stockholder may institute a suit for that purpose,
making the corporation a defendant. In such case, it is not necessary for the
shareholder to show that his private interest or damage, actual or threatened,
amounts to the sum which is required to give the federal courts jurisdiction.
That jurisdiction is tested by the value of the object sought to be gained by
the suit." Johnson v. Ingersoll, 63 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1933), 8 TULANE L.
REv. 138. See Coskery v. Roberts & Mander Corp., 189 F2d 234 (3d Cir.
1951) ; Marion Mortgage Co. v. Edmunds, 64 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1933) ; Hutch-
inson Box Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 Fed. 424 (8th Cir. 1924);
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value of the corporate right itself is insufficient, jurisdiction
of course will not lie. 4
"On the other hand, a shareholder having a certain class
of stock may maintain an action on behalf of himself and all
other holders of similar shares to prevent discrimination by
the directors against his class or to determine the rights of
the class in competition with the rights of other classes of
shareholders." 55 The right is primary to the shareholder,
and not secondary, and he must establish that his own in-
terest reaches the jurisdictional value.56 Again, we have not
a true class action but, as some courts have held, only a
spurious one.57 So also, the members of an assessment insur-
ance association suing (on behalf of themselves and other
members) the directors and officers of the association, cannot
claim that the assets of the association, in which the plain-
tiffs have an undivided interest, constitute the amount in
controversy for jurisdictional purposes. The direct and pri-
mary purpose of the suit is to protect the separate and dis-
tinct interests of the plaintiffs.5
ACTION AGAINST SHAREHOLDERS
In a suit brought by creditors on behalf of themselves
and all other creditors of an insolvent bank against the stock-
holders of the bank to recover the amount of their statutory
liability as such stockholders, the court is deemed to have
jurisdiction over the fund sought to be collected, and such
jurisdiction carries with it jurisdiction over all component
parts of the fund. Hence the fact that liability of certain
Taylor v. Gottschalk & Co., 39 F. Supp. 619 (M.D. Pa. 1941); cf. Wales v.
Jacobs, 104 F.2d 264 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 599 (1939).
54 O'Brien v. Lashar, 274 Fed. 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 640
(1921).
55 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 86, comment e (1942).
56 Ames v. Mengel Co., 190 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Cohn v. Cities Service
Co., 45 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1930); Schuman v. Little Bay Const. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Sobel v. Whittier Corp., 95 F. Supp. 643 (E.D.
Mich. 1951), appeal dismissed on ground question had become moot, 195 F.Zd
361 (6th Cir. 1952); Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957
(D. Del. 1949) ; see Note, 80 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 106 (1931).
57 See page 12 supra.
5s Woods v. Thompson, 14 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1926); cf. Cook v. Illinois
Bankers' Life Ass'n, 46 F2d 782 (7th Cir. 1931).
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stockholders may be less than $3,000 does not deprive the
court of jurisdiction as to them.59 The theory is analogous
to that which obtains in suits to collect, for the benefit of
creditors of corporations, unpaid subscriptions to stock.60
In Eresoh v. Braecklein,61 certain bank stockholders, who
had discharged their obligations under their stockholders'
liability, brought suit against other stockholders to create a
fund by ratable contribution from such other stockholders.
The fund was to be distributed among the plaintiffs. The
size of the fund necessary to put plaintiffs and defendants on
a parity basis was the amount in controversy; this is so not-
withstanding that the claims of plaintiffs were separable be-
tween them since plaintiffs had a common and undivided in-
terest in the fund.
TAXPAYEIs' ACTIONS
Colvin . City of Jaoksonville 62 was an action by a single
taxpayer, brought to restrain a threatened issue of bonds by
the City of Jacksonville for $1,000,000. It was proved that
the amount of taxes which would be levied on plaintiff's prop-
erty in case the bonds were issued would be less than $2,000,
the sum then necessary to confer jurisdiction. Plaintiff
contended that the amount of the bond issue, and not his tax
liability was "the amount in controversy." The trial court
dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The Su-
51 Brusselback v. Cago Corp., 85 F2d 20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
586 (1936) ; Brusselback v. Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank, 85 F.2d 617 (7th
Cir. 1936), cert. denied =b non;. Gage v. Brusselback, 299 U.S. 615 (1937);
United States v. Ascher, 49 F. Supp. 257 (S.D. Cal. 1943); United States v.
Earling, 39 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Wis. 1941); Holmberg v. Hannaford, 28 F.
Supp. 216 (S.D. Ohio 1939); Partridge v. Ainley, 24 F. Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y.
1938) ; RFC v. Central Republic Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1935).6 0 Handley v. Stutz, 137 U.S. 366 (1890) ; United States v. Freeman, 21 F.
Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1937).
61 133 F.2d 12 (10th Cir. 1943).
62 158 U.S. 456 (1895). "There is no allegation that the loss or injury to
any complainant amounts to the sum of $3000. It is well settled that in such
cases as this the amount in controversy must equal the jurisdictional sum as to
each complainant." Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243, 244 (1920); Rogers v.
Hennepin County, 239 U.S. 621 (1916). "The bill is filed by the plaintiff to
protect its individual interests, and to prevent damage to itself. It must, there-
fore, affirmatively appear that the acts charged against the city, and sought to
be enjoined, would result in its damage to (the jurisdictional amount]...
El Paso Water Co. v. El Paso, 152 U.S. 157, 159 (1894).
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preme Court in passing on the jurisdictional question upheld
the lower court. In reaching this conclusion the Supreme
Court examined Brownm v. Trousdale,6 3 an earlier decision
which was claimed to be contrary to its decision. In holding
that it was not, the Supreme Court said:
There [Brown v. Trousdale], several hundred taxpayers of a county
in Kentucky, for themselves and others associated with them, num-
bering about twelve hundred, and for and on behalf of all other tax-
payers in the county, "and for the benefit likewise of said county,'!
filed their bill of complaint against the county authorities and certain
funding officers, and all the holders of the bonds, seeking a decree
adjudging the invalidity of two series of bonds aggregating many hun-
dred thousand dollars, and perpetually enjoining their collection; and
an injunction was also asked as incidental to the principal relief
against the collection of a particular tax levied to meet the interest on
the bonds. The leading question here was whether the case had been
properly removed from the state court, and no consideration was
given to the case upon the merits. As to jurisdiction of this court,
we said: "The main question at issue was the validity of the bonds,
and that involved the levy and collection of taxes for a series of years
to pay interest thereon, and finally the principal thereof, and not the
mere restraining of the tax for a single year. The grievance com-
plained of was common to all the plaintiffs and to all whom they pro-
fessed to represent. The relief sought could not be legally injurious
to any of the taxpayers of the county, as such, and the interest of
those who did not join in or authorize the suit was identical with the
interest of the plaintiffs. The rule applicable to plaintiffs, each claim-
ing under a separate and distinct right, in respect to a separate and
distinct liability and that contested by the adverse party, is not ap-
plicable here. For although as to the tax for the particular year, the
injunction sought might restrain only the amount levied against each,
that order was but preliminary, and was not the main purpose of the
bill, but only incidental. The amount in dispute, in view of the main
controversy, far exceeded the limit upon our jurisdiction, and dis-
poses of the objection of appellees in that regard." 64
63138 U.S. 389 (1891).
64 Colvin v. City of Jacksonville, supra note 62 at 460-461. In Scott v.
Frazier, 258 Fed. 669, 672 (D.N.D. 1919), rev'd, 253 U.S. 243 (1920), the
court commented: "It is plain, therefore, that the court there regarded Brown
v. Trousdale as in harmony with the decision which it was rendering, or that
its language ought to be qualified so as to bring it into harmony."
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Thus the Supreme Court appears to have held that the
ordinary taxpayer's action involves merely his individual
right and if the value of his particular right is less than the
jurisdictional amount, the claims of other taxpayers cannot
be added to the plaintiff's to make up the requisite amount.
Only in the unusual case, such as Brown 'v. Trousdale, where
the Court found that the action was based on a public right,
may the claims of the various taxpayers be aggregated.
6 5
CREDITORS' ACTIONS
The question has arisen whether the claims of creditors
in a creditor's bill may be aggregated in order to make up
the necessary jurisdictional amount. As a general rule, this
cannot be done since the rights of the plaintiffs are deemed
separate and distinct and must satisfy the jurisdictional
mandate.6 6 However, aggregation under special circum-
stances is permitted. A bill in equity was brought by some
of the creditors of a corporation on behalf of all against the
corporation and its stockholders. The claim was founded on
the theory that, the corporation being insolvent and having
no other assets, the sums due to it from the stockholders on
their unpaid subscriptions to stock ought to be paid by them
to the corporation as a trust fund to be distributed among the
plaintiffs and all other creditors of the corporation, so far as
required to satisfy their just claims. There was diversity of
65Browt v. Trousdale has been cited quite frequently but in effect only to
distinguish it. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the rule as stated is sound.
A case cited by some text writers as standing for the public right theory is
City of Ottumwa v. City Water Supply Co., 119 Fed. 315 (8th Cir. 1902), 59
L.R.A. 604 (1903). An examination of the opinion shows that plaintiff's in-
terest there was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, so that the language in the
second paragraph of the opinion on page 318 was obiter. See Scott v. Frazier,
supra note 64; Larabee v. Dolley, 175 Fed. 365 (C.C.D. Kan. 1909), rev'd on
other grounds sub nor. Dolley v. Abilene Nat. Bank, 179 Fed. 461 (8th Cir.
1910), aff'd sub norn. Assaria State Bank v. Dolley, 219 U.S. 121 (1911).
(1 "In the case at bar, if several creditors of the company, each with a debt
less than $3000, had joined as plaintiffs, the demands could not have been ag-
gregated in order to confer jurisdiction . . . . Nor can Karatz's allegation
that he sued on behalf of others similarly situated help him." Lion Bonding
& Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77, 86 (1923); Frank & Lambert, Inc. v.
Rosengren, 97 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1938); Pianta v. H. M. Reich Co., 77 F.2d
888 (2d Cir. 1935); Auer v. Lombard, 72 Fed. 209 (1st Cir. 1896); Corcoran
v. Royal Development Co., 35 F. Supp. 400 (E.D.N.Y. 1940), aff'd, 121 F.2d
957 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 691 (1941).
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citizenship between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The
Supreme Court, observing that "[s]uch a bill can only be
maintained by one or more creditors in behalf of all, and not
by any one creditor to secure payment of his own debt to the
exclusion of others," 6 permitted aggregation of the claims
for trial court jurisdiction and, as to the jurisdictional
amount of $5,000, then required for appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, the Court held that "[t]he trust fund so
administered and ordered to be distributed... amounting to
much more than $5000, the appellate jurisdiction of this court
is not affected by the fact that the amounts decreed to some
of the creditors are less than that sum." 38
Where the question of aggregation or common fund is
not involved, it has been held that both the creditor's claim
and the value of the property sought to be made available
must meet the requirement of the jurisdictional amount.69
INJUNCTION AcTIONs
More than usual difficulty attaches to the problem of de-
termining the value of the amount in controversy when we
deal with actions seeking injunctive relief. Law review
writers have attempted to distill from the cases specific
classifications and categories, 70 with the final result, how-
1 Handley v. Stutz, 137 U.S. 366, 369 (1890).
8s Ibid. See Ackman v. Northern States Contracting Co., 110 F2d 774 (6th
Cir. 1940) ; Brusselback v. Cago Corp., 85 F.2d 20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 586 (1936). "It is a well recognized rule that two or more creditors
having separate and distinct demands, each less than three thousand dollars but
aggregating more than that sum, exclusive of interests and costs, cannot join
their demands in an action in order to confer jurisdiction upon a United States
Court. But in a class action of this kind the aggregate amount of the bonds,
and the aggregate amount of the fund sought to be produced for the benefit
of all bondholders by the establishment and enforcement of the assessment lien,
is the yardstick with which to determine the question whether the requisite
amount is in controversy. . . ." Hann v. City of Clinton, 131 F.2d 978, 982
(10th Cir. 1942). See also Essenkay Corp. v. Mangel Stores Corp., 10 F.
Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); cf. Corcoran v. Royal Development Co., supra
note 66.
69 Miller v. First Service Corp., 84 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1936), 109 A.L.R.
1179 (1937); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 65 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ark. 1946).
70 See, e.g., Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District Court,
38 HARV. L. REv. 733 (1925); Comments, 25 CALF. L. REv. 336 (1937), 49




ever, as one writer puts it, that "[t] he Court [United States
Supreme Court] thus appears to have worked out an instru-
ment which... may leave litigants in particular cases some-
what in the dark as to their prospects of gaining admittance
to the federal courts .... ," 71
The inherent difficulty is that of determining just what
is the "value of the right" sought to be protected from inva-
sion or interference. In general, it has been said, that value
is the damage to plaintiff's property which he will suffer if
the matters complained of are not enjoined. Thus, in Hunt
v. New York Cotton Exchange," the Exchange had brought
suit to enjoin Hunt from receiving and using the quotations
of sales made on the Exchange without its consent or ap-
proval. The Supreme Court held:
And the right to the quotations was declared as we said in Board of
Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Company,73 to be property, and the
Exchange may keep them to itself or communicate them to others.
The object of this suit is to protect that right. The right, therefore,
is the matter in dispute, and its value to the Exchange determines the
jurisdiction, not the rate paid by appellant [Hunt] to the Telegraph
Company. The value of the right was testified to be much greater
than $20004
In the course of its opinion, the Supreme Court cited
Mississippi & Missouri Railroad Company v. Ward,75 to
the effect that ". . . jurisdiction is tested by the value
of the object to be gained by the bill." 76 In that case,
plaintiff Ward, had ".... filed his bill in the District Court,
praying for an abatement of the Rock Island Bridge over the
Mississippi river, averring it to be a public nuisance, specially
injurious to him as an owner and navigator of steamboats to
and from St. Louis, Missouri, to St. Paul, Minnesota." 77 The
73 It should be noted, the writer states, that this instrument ". . . is well
adapted to supporting the Congressional policy toward federal jurisdiction."
Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 274, 284 (1939).
72 205 U.S. 322 (1907).
73 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
74 Hunt v. New York Cotton Exchange, supra note 72 at 336.
75 2 Black 485 (U.S. 1863).
78 See note 74 spra.
7 Mississippi & Mo. R.R. v. Ward, upra note 75 at 486. "Though this
was a suit for the abatement of a nuisance, the principle, from the standpoint
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Supreme Court, in determining that the jurisdictional
amount was present, said: "But the want of a sufficient
amount of damage having been sustained to give the Federal
Courts jurisdiction, will not defeat the remedy, as the re-
moval of the obstruction is the matter of controversy, and
the value of the object must govern." 178 If, by this state-
ment, the Court intended to hold that the value of the bridge
owned by the defendant represented the amount in contro-
versy, the holding seems out of harmony with the later Su-
preme Court decisions commencing with Hunt v. New York
Cotton Exchange.79  Ward's right to free navigation on the
Mississippi River and the value of that right should be de-
terminative of whether the jurisdictional amount is present.80
The Hunt case was cited and approved in Bitterman v.
Louisville d Nashville Railroad Company 81 which was an
action by the railroad to enjoin ticket brokers from dealing
in non-transferable round trip tickets issued at reduced rates
for passage over the lines of the railway. In sustaining jur-
isdiction, the Court held: "... the substantial character of
the jurisdictional averment in the bill is to be tested, not
by the mere immediate pecuniary damage resulting from the
acts complained of, but by the value of the business to be
protected and the rights of property which the complainant
sought to have recognized and enforced." 8 2
of the amount in controversy, is believed to be quite similar to suits to enjoin
the continuance of a nuisance. Indeed, the great majority of the cases .. .
are suits for injunction." Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the Uated States
District Court, 38 HAsv. L. Rav. 733, 740 n.19 (1925).
7s Mississippi & Mo. R-R. v. Ward, supra note 75 at 492.
79205 U.S. 322 (1907).80 1t should be noted that the Court in the Mississippi case at page 492
argued that Ward was not suing only for himself: "The private party sues
rather as a public prosecutor than on his own account. . . .He seeks redress
of a continuing trespass and wrong against himself, and acts in behalf of all
others, who are or may be injured .... " Cf. Brown v. Trousdale, 138 U.S.
389 (1891).
81207 U.S. 205 (1907).
82 Id. at 225. See Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat &
Power Co., 239 U.S. 121 (1915), where the Court said, at page 126, that
"[t]he District Court erred in testing the jurisdiction by the amount that it
would cost defendant to remove its poles and wires where they conflict or
interfere with those of complainant, and replacing them in such a position as
to avoid the interference. Complainant sets up a right to maintain and operate
its plant and conduct its business free from wrongful interference by defen-
dant. This right is alleged to be of a value in excess of the jurisdictional
[ VOL. 29
1954 ] MONETARY JURISDICTION
Although the cryptic holding in the Mississippi case, 3
has been cited in lower court decisions-in other words, cases
apparently adopting the so-called defendant viewpoint 84 -it
would appear that these cases cannot now be safely relied on
in view of the decisions by the Supreme Court, starting with
the Hunt case, which seem to adopt the plaintiff viewpoint.8 5
And most of the more recent lower court decisions involving
ordinary private injunction cases support this conclusion.
In an action to enjoin continued trespasses, it has been held
that the plaintiff must establish that the damage to his in-
terest will exceed the jurisdictional amount; thus, if the
trespasses sought to be enjoined will make the plaintiff's
property almost valueless and such property is worth over
the requisite amount, jurisdiction exists.86 Where the suit
is one to enjoin infringement of a trade name or generally to
enjoin unfair competition, the test has been held to be the
amount, and at the hearing no question seems to have been made but that it
has such value. The relief sought is the protection of that right, now and in
the future, and the value of that protection is determinative of the jurisdiction."
See also Western & Ati. R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n, 261 U.S. 264 (1923), where
the Court observed at page 267: "Plaintiff seeks to be relieved not only from
constructing the side track but also from maintaining it in suitable condition for
use, and from the cost and expense of using and operating it for the movement
of cars to and from the warehouse. The value of all these is involved.";
City of Memphis v. Ingram, 98 F. Supp. 395 (E.D. Ark. 1951).
83 Mississippi & Mo. RE. v. Ward, 2 Black 485 (U.S. 1863).
84 See American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Godfrey, 158 Fed. 225 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied mub nor. Utah Consol. Mining Co. v. Godfrey, 27 U.S.
597 (1907) ; Rainey v. Herbert, 55 Fed. 443 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 154 U.S.
514 (1893); Ross v. Southern Ry., 20 F. Supp. 556 (W.D.S.C. 1937); Amelia
Milling Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R., 123 Fed. 811 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1903) ;
Whitman v. Hubbell, 30 Fed. 81 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887); Dobie, Jurisdictional
Ainount in the United States District Court, 38 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1925).
85 Hunt v. New York Cotton Exchange, 205 U.S. 322 (1907). Of course,
the determination in the Mississippi case, that not only past but potential dam-
age will be considered in determining whether the jurisdictional amount is
present, is supported by authorities. See Western & Atl. R.R. v. Railroad
Comm'n, supra note 82; Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat
& Power Co., supra note 82; Berryman v. Whitman College, 222 U.S. 334
(1912); Bitterman v. Louisville & N. R.R., supra note 81.
83 Lansden v. Hart, 180 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1950); Cerritos Gun Club v.
Hall, 96 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1938); Swan Island Club v. Ansell, 51 F.2d 337
(4th Cir. 1931), 10 N. C. L. Rlv. 211; Fidler v. Roberts, 41 F.2d 305 (7th
Cir. 1930); Winola Lake & Land Co. v. Gorham, 13 F. Supp. 721 (M.D. Pa.
1936); cf. Colony Coal & Coke Corp. v. Napier, 28 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Ky.
1939).
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entire worth of the business or the good will thus interfered
with.87
And, if the property right has a value in excess of $3,000
the federal court has jurisdiction even though the plaintiff
had not suffered over $3,000 damages at the time suit was
instituted.8
However, it has been held that the measure may not be
the entire value of the name sought to be protected, but only
the amount of the injury actually threatened by the acts of
the defendant. Thus where an Ohio oil company, making no
sales in Connecticut except oil to industrial concerns, sought
relief from alleged unfair competition by a Connecticut cor-
poration making gasoline sales from a single filling station
to residents of a city in Connecticut, the "amount in contro-
versy" for jurisdictional purposes was not to be measured by
the total value, wherever found, of the right for which pro-
tection was sought by the Ohio company but by the value of
the portion thereof that was threatened by the acts of the
Connecticut corporation.89 A somewhat similar measure has
been applied where the action is to enjoin price cutting of
plaintiff's products in violation of fair trade contracts,90 and
to enjoin unlawful strikes or picketing.9 1 In this type of
87 See Food Fair Stores v. Food Fair, 177 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949) ; Hanson
v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 163 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 855 (1948) ; Harvey v. American Coal Co., 50 F.2d 832 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 669 (1931); Wisconsin Elec. Co. v. Dumore Co., 35 F.2d 555
(6th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 813 (1931).
88 John B. Kelly, Inc. v. Lehigh Naval Coal Co., 151 F.2d 743 (3d Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946) (In an action by a lower riparian
owner to enjoin nuisance and continuing trespass by discharges of refuse into
navigable river, the jurisdictional amount is determined on the basis of the
property right injured, and not by the monetary damages suffered by the plain-
tiff when the action was instituted.).
89 Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 39 F. Supp. 68 (D. Conn. 1941), re'd
on other grounds, 127 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1942); cf. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v.
Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1941).90 Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Rosen, 115 F. Supp. 146 (N.D. Ill. 1953)
Caron Corp. v. Wolf Drug Co., 40 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.J. 1941); Miles Lab-
oratories, Inc. v. Seignious, 30 F. Supp. 549 (E.D.S.C. 1939); General Shoe
Corp. v. Rosen, 29 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. W. Va. 1939); James Heddon's Sons
v. Callender, 28 F. Supp. 643 (D. Minn. 1939); Calvert Distilling Co. v.
Brandon, 24 F. Supp. 857 (W.D.S.C. 1938).91 Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); Tri-City Central
Trades Council v. American Steel Foundries, 238 Fed. 728 (7th Cir. 1916),
rev'd in part, 257 U.S. 184 (1921), 27 A.L.R. 360 (1923); Fehr Baking Co.
v. Bakers' Union, 20 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. La. 1937).
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case, it has been held that "[i]t was not necessary that 3000
worth of property should be destroyed before the federal
court acquired jurisdiction. The alleged threatened damage
far exceeded the statutory sum necessary to give the district
court jurisdiction." 92
A narrower view on what may be considered in deter-
mining the jurisdictional amount has been taken, it seems,
in some of the later cases. Thus, where plaintiff sought to
enjoin picketing of its stores by a union to secure collective
bargaining rights, the court held that the amount in contro-
versy had not been shown since the measure to be used was
the loss of profits resulting from the decrease in business
directly attributable to the picketing, of which proof was
lacking.9 3
In deciding these last-noted cases, the lower courts were
relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in KV0, Inc.
v. Associated Press.94  There the Associated Press, a non-
profit membership corporation, sought to enjoin alleged
pirating of its news by a radio station for the purpose of
broadcasting what it styled "The Newspaper of the Air."
Dismissing the bill, the Court said:
The bill seeks redress for damage to the respondent's business
and for damage to the business of some or all of its members. The
right for which the suit seeks protection is, therefore, the right to
conduct those enterprises free of the alleged unlawful interference by
the petitioner. No facts are pleaded which tend to show the value
of that right .... [W] here the allegations as to the amount in con-
troversy are challenged by the defendant in an appropriate manner,
the plaintiff must support them by competent proof. The petitioner's
motion was an appropriate method of challenging the jurisdictional
allegations of the complaint .... This required the trial court to in-
quire as to its jurisdiction before considering the merits of the prayer
for preliminary injunction. And in such inquiry complainant had
the burden of proof. The only attempt to meet that burden is a reply
92Tri-City Central Trades Council v. American Steel Foundries, s-pra note
91 at 730.
93 S. S. Kresge Co. v. Amsler, 99 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 641 (1939). See Stangard Dickerson Corp. v. United Elec. Radio
& Mach. Workers, 33 F. Supp. 449 (D.NJ. 1940).
94299 U.S. 269 (1936), 25 GEo. L. J. 750 (1937), 15 TFXAS L. Rav. 508
(1937).
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affidavit filed on behalf of respondent, wherein it is deposed "that the
payments made by newspapers for said news sold to them by com-
plainant in the territory served by said radio station is upwards of
$8000 per month, which is being imperilled and jeopardized by the
acts of defendant.., by its unlawful and wrongful appropriation of
complainant's news, and said sum greatly exceeds the sum of Three
Thousand Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, and complainant is
in danger of losing said memberships and payments if defendant's
practices in respect to pirating said news is not enjoined." 95
This affidavit was held by the Court to be "wholly inade-
quate." First, somewhat sophistically, the Court relied on
the fact that the association operated not to make profit from
furnishing news to its members, but rather divided the ex-
pense among them. And second, the Court stressed the fail-
ure on the part of the plaintiff to show that any member
threatened to withdraw from the association as a consequence
of the acts sought to be prohibited.
It is significant, however, that the Court dismissed the
attempt by the Association to prove specific damage not as
irrelevant, but as unsatisfactory.9 6 It cannot be gainsaid
that the rule of the KTVOS case has not been strictly adhered
to by subsequent lower court decisions.97
Another class of injunction actions where a narrow rule
is applied, is that in which an element of comity enters for
the reason that the injunction sought is against action by
state or municipal officials.9 8 This fact provides an fllui-
95 KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, supra note 94 at 277-278.
96 "The damage in the Associated Press case was to its members and this
was not shown. Neither was it alleged or proved that any member threatened
to withdraw or to reduce its payments." Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 76(1939). See Caron Corp. v. Wolf Drug Co., 40 F. Supp. 103, 105 (D.N.J.
1941) ; Note, 49 YALE L. J. 274 (1939).
97 See note 90 supra. See Hanson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 163 F2d
74 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 855 (1948); Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp. v. Kline, 132 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1942); Indian Territory Oil &
Gas Co. v. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co., 95 F.2d 711 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 607 (1938); Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. California Re-
frigerator Repair Shop, 11 F.R.D. 313 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
98 "From the beginning suits between citizens of different states, or involv-
ing federal questions, could neither be brought in the federal courts nor re-
moved to them, unless the value of the matter in controversy was more than
a specified amount .... The policy of the statute calls for its strict construc-
tion . . . . Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments,
which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine
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nating clue toward explaining the somewhat contradictory
criteria which the courts have used to measure the value of
the matter in controversy. Stated baldly, and perhaps with
some measure of oversimplification, the difference is based
on whether the rights involved are public or private; or put
another way, whether the injunction is against governmental
action, either on the state or the municipal level. 9
In the leading case of Healy v. Ratta,100 the action was
by a resident of Massachusetts selling vacuum cleaners
through travelling salesmen, to enjoin the Chief of Police of
Manchester, New Hampshire, from enforcing a state statute
imposing upon peddlers and hawkers statewide and local
license fees. The total annual tax for the conduct of busi-
ness in Manchester-the only tax directly involved-was
about 300. Plaintiff's ground for relief was that the statute
denied him the equal protection of the laws by exempting
certain classes of vendors in which the plaintiff was not in-
cluded. The district court granted the injunction measuring
the amount in controversy by the capitalized value of the
annual tax.1°1 The First Circuit Court of Appeals unani-
mously affirmed, apparently on the ground that the right to
do business in New Hampshire was the measure, although the
action involved only the local City of Manchester tax.102
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decree "with
instructions to the district court to dismiss the cause for want
of jurisdiction" on the ground that only the tax itself was
the matter in controversy and that it ($300) was far below
the jurisdictional minimum.
their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined."
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 269-270 (1934). See DiGiovanni v. Camden
Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 73 (1935).
OD This distinction has been emphasized, inter alla, in law review notes and
comments. See Comments, Federal Courts: Jurisdictiomal Anmunt in Ininc-
tion Suits in Federal District Courts, 25 CALIF. L. Rv. 336 (1937) ; Federal
Jurisdictional Amount Requirement in Infunction Suits, 49 YALE L. J. 274(1939).
100 292 U.S. 263 (1934), 34 CoL. L. RFv. 1146. See Notes, 48 Hazv. L. REv.
95 (1934), 19 MINN. L. REv. 768 (1935); Comment, 20 IowA L. Rv. 159
(1934).
1011 F. Supp. 669 (D.N.H. 1932).
102 67 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1933).
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It has been said that it is the value of the "object of the suit"
which determines the jurisdictional amount in the federal courts ....
But this does not mean objects which are merely collateral or inci-
dental to the determination of the issue raised by the pleadings. The
statute itself does not speak of objects of the suit. It confers juris-
diction only if "the matter in controversy exceeds .. . the sum or
value of $3,000.00." . .. The tax, payment of which is demanded or
resisted, is the matter in controversy, since payment of it would avoid
the penalty and end the dispute. . . .Whether and in what manner
the penalty for non-payment may be enforced in the event the tax is
valid are but collateral and incidental to the determination whether
payment may be exacted. Only when the suit is brought to restrain
imposition of a penalty already accrued by reason of failure to comply
with the statute or order assailed can the penalty be included as any
part of the matter in controversy. . . .Where a challenged statute
commands the suppression or restriction of a business without ref-
erence to the payment of any tax, the right to do the business, or
the injury to it, is the matter in controversy. . . .The disputed tax
is the matter in controversy, and its value, not that of the penalty
or loss which payment of the tax would avoid, determines the
jurisdiction. 103
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court found it
necessary to distinguish two of its earlier decisions. Fore-
most, perhaps, was Berryman v. Board of Trustees of
Whitman College.10 4 In that case, the college, claiming
perpetual legislative exemption from taxation, under the
terms of the charter creating it, resisted collection by
the county of a claimed tax of $946.00. The action was
commenced in a state court and, thereafter, was removed
to a federal court. On a motion to remand, the issue was
whether the jurisdictional amount was present. The Supreme
Court held that not the tax itself, but the value of the con-
tractual right to permanent exemption from taxation granted
in the charter, was the measure, and upheld federal
jurisdiction.
103 Healy v. Ratta, supra note 100 at 268-269. See Sociedad Espafiola de
Auxilio v. Buscaglia, 164 F.2d 745 (1st Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 867
(1948).
104222 U.S. 334 (1912). The Court followed two earlier decisions: Deposit




Considering the averments of the bill, the amount and value of
the property of the corporation, and the nature and character of the
contract of exemption asserted, it cannot be doubted that the value
of the thing in issue, the contract right, exceeded in value the juris-
dictional amount. Granting that the uncertainties of the future and
the shifting ownership of property forbids, in a contest merely over
the validity of a tax, adding the sum of future taxes which might be
levied to the amount of taxes actually levied for the purpose of juris-
diction, that principle can have no application to a case where the
issue presented is not only the right to collect, but also to levy all
future taxes. The admission that the right to tax may be abridged
by contract, and that such contract may not be impaired without vio-
lating the Constitution, carries with it of necessity the power and the
duty to protect the contract right and in the nature of things causes
jurisdiction for such purpose to be measured by the value of the right
to be protected, and not by the value of some mere isolated element
of that right.105
The ground for distinction as stated by the Supreme
Court in the Ratta, case is that: "A different question is pre-
sented where the matter in controversy is the validity of a
permanent exemption by contract from an annual property
tax . .. ., '10 The soundness of this distinction has been
questioned. 0 7
Its other decision, which the Supreme Court felt con-
strained to distinguish in the Ratta case, is Western & At-
lantic Railroad v. Railroad Commission of Georgia.0 s In
that case, the plaintiff had been directed by a state order to
establish and operate an industrial spur track. The installa-
tion of the track would cost 1,266.24 and the Supreme Court
allowed plaintiff to capitalize its annual costs on account of
interest on the initial investment, depreciation, maintenance
and operating expenses of the track in arriving at the con-
clusion that the jurisdictional amount was involved. The
10 Berryman v. Board of Trustees of Whitman College, sapra note 104 at
345-346. See Reiling v. Lacy, 93 F. Supp. 462 (D. Md. 1950), appeal dismissed
sub norn. Reiling v. Tawes, 341 U.S. 901 (1951); Sociedad Espafiola de Auxilio
v. Buscaglia, supra note 103.
106 Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 271 (1934).
107 See Note, 48 HAgv. L. REv. 95, 99 (1934); Comment, 25 CALIF. L. REv.
336, 344 (1937). But see Gypsy Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 6 F. Supp.
6, 11 (N.D. Okla. 1934), modified, 292 U.S. 611 (1934).
103 261 U.S. 264 (1923).
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Supreme Court in Healy v. Ratta, referring to the Western
& Atlantic Railroad case, observed: "A different question
is presented where the matter in controversy is ... the valid-
ity of an order of a state commission directing a railroad to
construct and maintain an unremunerative spur track ...
There the value of the matter drawn into controversy, . . .
the order to maintain a permanent structure for an unlimited
time, is more than a limited number of the annual payments
demanded." 109 This is undoubtedly a sound distinction.110
The Supreme Court's reluctance to enjoin enforcement
of state statutes or regulations was again emphasized in
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp."" The suit
there was brought to restrain on constitutional grounds the
enforcement of an Indiana statute regulating the business of
purchasing contracts arising out of retail installment sales,
including provisions for licenses, for classifications of con-
tracts, and for fixing maximum finance charges. The an-
swer traversed the allegation made in the complaint, that the
requisite jurisdictional amount was involved, but no point
was made before the three-judge district court that the juris-
dictional amount was lacking. This court entered a decree
upon findings of fact and conclusions of law, granting a per-
manent injunction. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court
raised the question of jurisdiction and granted leave to file
an additional brief on this question.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the decree below and
remanding the case with directions to dismiss the complaint
for the want of jurisdiction, laid down two principles. First,
it held that the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction must
prove that jurisdiction is present, thus resolving a long-
standing conflict over the status of the burden of proof on
that question.
The authority which the statute vests in the court to enforce the limi-
tations of its jurisdiction precludes the idea that jurisdiction may be
109 See note 106 supra.
110 See Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U.S. 95 (1939); Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66
(1939) ; Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209(1938).
111298 U.S. 178 (1936).
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maintained by mere averment or that the party asserting jurisdiction
may be relieved of his burden by any formal procedure. If his allega-
tions of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in any
appropriate manner, he must support them by competent proof. And
where they are not so challenged the court may still insist that the
jurisdictional facts be established or the case be dismissed, -and for
that purpose the court may demand that the party alleging jurisdic-
tion justify his allegations by a preponderance of evidence .... Here,
the allegation in the bill of complaint as to jurisdictional amount was
traversed by the answer. The court made no adequate finding upon
that issue of fact, and the record contains no evidence to support the
allegation of the bill."12
On the second point, the Supreme Court held:
Respondent invokes the principle that jurisdiction is to be tested
by the value of the object or right to be protected against interference.
[citing cases] But in the instant case, the statute does not attempt
to prevent respondent from conducting its business. There is no
showing that it cannot obtain a license and proceed with its opera-
tions. The value or net worth of the business which respondent trans-
acts in Indiana is not involved save to the extent that it may be
affected by the incidence of the statutory regulation. The object or
right to be protected against unconstitutional interference is the right
to be free of that regulation. The value of that right may be measured
by the loss, if any, which would follow the enforcement of the rules
prescribed. The particular allegations of respondent's bill as to the
extent or value of its business throw no light upon that subject.
They fail to set forth any facts showing what, if any, curtailment of
business and consequent loss the enforcement of the statute would
involve. The bill is thus destitute of any appropriate allegation as to
jurisdictional amount save the general allegation that the matter in
controversy exceeds $3,000.113
Not much later, the Supreme Court had before it Kroger
Grocery &. Baking Co. v. Lutz,114 again a case involving an
Indiana statute. There the plaintiff sued to restrain the en-
forcement of an order of the Milk Control Board of Indiana,
made June 12, 1936, fixing selling prices of milk in a certain
area. A three-judge district court dismissed the action for
212 Id. at 189-190.
11 Id. at 181.
214299 U.S. 300 (1936).
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the want of jurisdiction on the ground that the requisite
jurisdictional amount was not involved. The district court
had found that the annual loss in profits would not exceed
$500, and that the Milk Control Law would expire by limi-
tation on July 1, 1937. To support its contention that the
jurisdictional amount was present, plaintiff sought to capi-
talize its $500 loss at 5% so that the alleged amount in con-
troversy amounted to $10,000. The Supreme Court, relying
on its McNutt decision that the value of the right to be free
from the regulation may be measured by the loss that would
follow the enforcement of the rule prescribed, said ".... that
basis of ascertaining a capital loss is not available to com-
plainant here, as the statute, and with it the order, expire
by limitation on July 1, 1937. The hurt by reason of the
regulation does not appear to be greater than the loss sus-
tained while the statute is in operation." 115
Even where public problems are involved, the Supreme
Court, in determining whether the jurisdictional amount is
present, seems to have made a distinction between cases in-
volving taxation or regulation and those involving prohibi-
tion. In Gibbs v. Buck 116 the Supreme Court had before it
an appeal from the order of a three-judge district court re-
fusing to dismiss a bill of complaint for failure, inter alia,
to ". .. set out facts sufficient to show Federal or equity
jurisdiction . . .*117 and "... granting an interlocutory in-
junction against the enforcement of a Florida statute aimed
at combinations fixing the price for the privilege of rendering
privately or publicly for profit copyrighted musical composi-
tions." 118 The plaintiffs were the American Society of Com-
posers, Authors and Publishers, a New York unincorporated
association, commonly known as ASCAP; Gene Buck, as
115 Id. at 302. See KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269 (1936).
116 307 U.S. 66 (1939), 52 HARV. L. Rav. 1360. Some lower court cases
applying the Gibbs doctrine are: Lansden v. Hart, 180 F.2d 679 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950); John B. Kelly, Inc. v. Lehigh Naval Coal
Co., 151 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946) ; Sturgeon
v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 143 F.2d 819 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779(1944); First English Lutheran Church v. Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 135
F.2d 701 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 757 (1943); Campbell Soup Co.
v. Diehm, 111 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1952).




president of the Society; various corporations publishing
musical compositions; a number of authors and composers
of copyrighted music; and several next of kin of deceased
composers and authors. The injunction suit was brought by
them "on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
members of the Society, too numerous to make it practicable
to join them as plaintiffs in a matter of common and general
interest," 119 on the theory that the Florida law impinged
upon rights given by the Copyright Act of 1909,120 deprived
plaintiffs of rights without due process of law and without
the equal protection of the laws, impaired the obligations of
contracts already executed, and operated as an ex post facto
law. ASCAP was founded to license performance of copy-
righted music for profit for limited periods and otherwise
protect copyrights. The Florida statute 121 made it unlawful
for owners of copyrighted musical compositions to combine
into any corporation, association or other entity to fix license
fees "for any use or rendition of copyrighted vocal or instru-
mental musical compositions for private or public perfor-
mance for profit," when the members of the combination
constituted "a substantial number of the persons, firms or
corporations within the United States" owning musical copy-
rights. The statute declared the combination an unlawful
monopoly, the price-fixing in restraint of trade, and the col-
lection of license fees and all contracts by the combination
illegal. In affirming the lower court, the Supreme Court
held:
The essential matter in controversy here is the right of the mem-
bers, in association through the Society, to conduct the business of
licensing the public performance for profit of their copyrights. This
method of combining for contracts is interdicted by the Florida stat-
ute. It is not a question of taxation or regulation but prohibition.
Under such circumstances, the issue on jurisdiction is the value of
this right to conduct the business free of the prohibition of the statute.
To determine the value of this right the District Court had the ad-
mitted facts that more than three hundred contracts expiring in 1940
119 Ibid.
12035 STAT. 1075 (1909), as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1952).
121 Presently FLA. STAT. § 543.01 (1951).
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were in existence between the Society and the Florida users; that in
1936 alone almost sixty thousand dollars was collected from the users,
and that similar sums were expected for the remainder of the term.
While the net profits of the business in Florida is not shown, the busi-
ness of the Society, as a whole, is profitable. The three publisher
parties receive more than $150,000 yearly and individuals more than
$5000 per year each. The cost of compliance with its requirements
is evidence also of the value of the right of freedom from the act. The
complainants, other than the Society, allege without traverse that the
cost to each one of providing individually in Florida the services now
provided by the Society for each member would exceed $10,000.
Whether this is annually, for the length of the agreement or for some
other term is not shown. From these facts, the finding of the District
Court that the matter in controversy-the value of the aggregate
rights of all members to conduct their business through the Society-
exceeds $3000 in value is fully supported. 122
In other words, the Court found ii effect a true class action
which involved the common and undivided interest of the
members to license their music through ASCAP, although
the actual amount in controversy was left rather nebulous
except that in the judgment of the Court this interest was
indubitably in excess of the jurisdictional minimum. 12 3
The Supreme Court found occasion to distinguish this
decision from that which it had rendered in the Mc~utt case.
"There the State of Indiana had passed an act regulating,
not prohibiting, the bnsinp.qs of the Acceptance Corporation.
122 Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 74-75 (1939). A companion case, Buck v.
Gallagher, 307 U.S. 95 (1939), dealt with a State of Washington statute which
purported not to prohibit, but only to regulate ASCAP activities, by requiring
registration and that rates be assessed on a specific basis. The Court held at
page 100: "Whether a state statute is regulatory or prohibitory, when a bill
is filed against its enforcement .... the matter in controversy is the right
to carry on business free of the regulation or prohibition of the statute. Where
the statute is regulatory the value of the right to carry on the business, as was
said in McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, supra, may be
shown by evidence of the loss that would follow the enforcement of the statute.
And this loss may be something other than the difference between the net profit
free of regulation and the net profit subject to regulation. The difficulties of
determining the value of rights by calculating past profits as compared with
possible future profits, influenced by the single factor of statutury regulation,
are obvious. This difference is not the only test of the value of the right in
question. The value of the matter in controversy may be at least as accu-
rately shown by proving the additional cost of complying with the regulation.
This factor was not offered in evidence in the McNutt case." See Carl Fischer,
Inc. v. Shannon, 26 F. Supp. 727 (D. Mont. 1938).123 But see Gibbs v. Buck, supra note 122 at 88-92 (dissenting opinion).
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The right for which protection was sought was the right to
be free of regulation. It was to be measured by the loss, if
any, following enforcement of regulation. This was not al-
leged or proved." 124
As to the KT 7OS case 121-a non-public case-the Su-
preme Court made this observation:
... [R] elief was sought to enjoin alleged pirating, by radio, of news
furnished by the Associated Press to its members. The right for
which protection was sought was "the right to conduct those enter-
prises free of" interference. On the issue of the value of this right,
it was deposed only that the Associated Press received more than
$8,000 per month for news in the territory served by the broadcasting
station and was in danger of losing the payments. The Associated
Press was a non-profit corporation, operated without the purpose of
profiting from its services to members and equitably dividing the ex-
penses among them. The damage in the Associated Press case was
to its members and this was not shown. Neither was it alleged or
proved that any member threatened to withdraw or to reduce its
payments. 126
Another case should be noted. In Petroleum Explora-
tion, Inc. v. Public Service OomMission 27 the Supreme Court
was concerned with an action to enjoin a state public service
commission from prosecuting a rate investigation, regulatory
rather than prohibitory. Bound by the finding of fact by the
district court that the cost of compliance 12s would be in ex-
cess of the jurisdictional minimum, the Supreme Court found
the value of the matter in controversy fulfilled the jurisdic-
tional requirement, even though it did not find occasion for
equitable intervention.1 29
124 Gibbs v. Buck, supra note 122 at 75.
125 KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269 (1936).
128 Gibbs v. Buck, supra note 122 at 75-76.
127 304 U.S. 209 (1938).
128 "It was found by the District Court from the testimony at the trial that
'the expense to plaintiff of complying with said orders would be more than
$3000.00 in employing appraisers, geologists, engineers, accountants, etc., to
show the original and historical cost of its properties, cost of reproduction as
a going concern, and other elements of value recognized by the law of the
land for rate making purposes.'" Id. at 215.
129 As to an adequate form of state relief, see Illinois Commerce Comm'n
v. Thomson, 318 U.S. 675 (1943). It should be kept in mind that equity may
impose terms and conditions on the party at whose instance it proposes to act
and that "[t]he power to impose such conditions is founded upon, and arises
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As it appears from the cases just considered, the Su-
preme Court seems to have adopted the plaintiff viewpoint
championed by Professor Dobie 130 in contradistinction to the
defendant viewpoint, even in injunction, nuisance and con-
tinuing trespass suits or the like, where the pecuniary value
of plaintiff's status in the litigation may frequently differ
from that of the defendant. Some of the comparatively
recent lower court decisions, however, made the defendant
viewpoint available as an alternative theory. Thus, in Ronzio
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co.1 3 1-an action
originating in a state court against the railroad to quiet the
title to certain water rights-the question whether the juris-
dictional amount was present arose in connection with the
railroad's petition for removal. The court held: "In deter-
mining the matter in controversy, we may look to the object
sought to be accomplished by the plaintiffs' complaint; the
test for determining the amount in controversy is the pecuni-
ary result to either party which the judgment would directly
produce." 132 In reaching this conclusion the court relied on
the holding of Justice Field in Smith v. Adams 133 that:
By matter in dispute is meant the subject of litigation, the matter
upon which the action is brought and issue is joined, and in relation
to which, if the issue be one of fact, testimony is taken. It is con-
ceded that the pecuniary value of the matter in dispute may be de-
termined, not only by the money judgment prayed, where such is the
case, but in some cases by the increased or diminished value of the
from, the discretion which the court has in such cases, to grant, or not to
grant, the injunction applied for." Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S.
153, 156 (1939).
130 See Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District Court,
38 HARV. L. Ra,. 733 (1925). "Dean Dobie, who is now a Judge of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, calls this 'the plaintiff-viewpoint rule.' It
is not always easy to apply." Associated Press v. Emmett, 45 F. Supp. 907,
914 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
131 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940). See Purcell v. Summers, 126 F.2d 390,
394 (4th Cir. 1942); Central Mexico Light & Power Co. v. Munch, 116 F2d
85, 87 (2d Cir. 1940).
132 Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., supra note 131 at 606, 19 TEXAS L.
REV. 514 (1941). See Comment, Federal Jurisdictional Amount Requirement in
Injunction Suits, 49 YALE L.J. 274 (1939).
133 130 U.S. 167 (1889).
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property directly affected by the relief prayed, or by the pecuniary
result to one of the parties immediately from the judgment.1 34
This case has been cited frequently by lower federal courts
as recognizing the rule that the amount in controversy may
also be viewed from the defendant's viewpoint. Thus, in
Ridder Bros, Inc. v. Blethen 1 35 the majority observed that
the "... value of the 'thing sought to be accomplished by the
action' may relate to either or any party to the action." 136
In a strong dissent, Circuit Judge Garrecht said:
A careful check of all the authorities cited by the appellants and
quoted in the majority opinion will bear out the observation that the
lower Federal courts have recognized the rule that the value in con-
troversy may be viewed from the defendant's standpoint but there are
no cases in which the United States Supreme Court has adopted this
rule. I am of the opinion that the plaintiff's viewpoint rule is the one
recognized by the Supreme Court. It is the reasonable rule because
the plaintiff must open the case and in order to sue in the Federal
Court the plaintiff must have a matter in controversy of the value of
$3,000. If the plaintiff's right is not worth that much, there is no
jurisdiction.13 7
13- Id. at 175. The court in the Ronrio case also relied on Cowell v. City
Water Supply Co., 121 Fed. 53 (8th Cir. 1903), where that court said at page
57: "Perhaps these cases sufficiently illustrate and establish the rule that it
is the amount or value of that which the complainant claims to recover, or
the sum or value of that which the defendant will lose if the complainant suc-
ceeds in his suit, that constitutes the jurisdictional sum or value of the matter
in dispute, which tests the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United
States [now the United States District Courts]."
135 142 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944). The court also relied on Mississippi &
Mo. R.R. v. Ward, 2 Black 485 (U.S. 1863).
136 Ridder Bros., Inc. v. Blethen, mupra note 135 at 399.
137 Id. at 400-401. Some other recent lower court cases favoring the double
viewpoint test are: MacCormick v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. Mo. 1950);
Doggett v. Hunt, 93 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. Ala. 1950); Sterl v. Sears, 88 F.
Supp. 431 (N.D. Tem. 1950); Shipe v. Floral Hills, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 985
(W.D. Mo. 1949); Griffith v. Enochs, 43 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. La. 1942). See
the rather cryptic statement in Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942) at
page 447: "In a diversity litigation the value of the 'matter in controversy'
is measured not by the monetary result of determining the principle involved,
but by its pecuniary consequence to those involved in the litigation." In Spieler
v. Haas, 79 F. Supp. 835 (S.D. N.Y. 1948), the court said at page 836:
"Moreover, plaintiffs cannot make out the jurisdictional amount by referring
to the prospective capital gain of their landlord. While it has been said that
the increased value of the property affected may provide a basis for jurisdic-
tion, Smith v. Adams. . . . it was there suggested that the rule was limited
to actions such as those to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom."
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